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Abstract:  26 
Objective: The propensity of people vulnerable to suicide to make poor life decisions is 27 
increasingly well documented. Do they display an extreme degree of decision biases?  The 28 
present study used a behavioral decision approach to examine the susceptibility of low-lethality 29 
and high-lethality suicide attempters to common decision biases, which may ultimately obscure 30 
alternative solutions and deterrents to suicide in a crisis. 31 
 32 
Method: We assessed older and middle-aged individuals who made high-lethality (medically 33 
serious; N=31) and low-lethality suicide attempts (N=29).  Comparison groups included suicide 34 
ideators (N=30), non-suicidal depressed (N=53), and psychiatrically healthy participants (N= 35 
28). Attempters, ideators, and non-suicidal depressed participants had unipolar non-psychotic 36 
major depression. Decision biases included sunk cost (inability to abort an action for which 37 
costs are irrecoverable), framing (responding to superficial features of how a problem is 38 
presented), under/overconfidence (appropriateness of confidence in knowledge), and 39 
inconsistent risk perception. Data were collected between June of 2010 and February of 2014. 40 
 41 
Results: Both high- and low-lethality attempters were more susceptible to framing effects, as 42 
compared to the other groups included in this study (p< 0.05, Șp2 =.06). In contrast, low-lethality 43 
attempters were more susceptible to sunk costs than both the comparison groups and high-44 
lethality attempters (p< 0.01, Șp2 =.09). These group differences remained after accounting for 45 
age, global cognitive performance, and impulsive traits.  Premorbid IQ partially explained group 46 
differences in framing effects.  47 
 48 
Conclusion: Suicide attempters’ failure to resist framing may reflect their inability to consider a 49 
decision from an objective standpoint in a crisis.  Low-lethality attempters’ failure to resist sunk-50 
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cost may reflect their tendency to confuse past and future costs of their behavior, lowering their 51 
threshold for acting on suicidal thoughts.  52 
 53 
Key words: Depression, decision-making, suicide, attempted, elderly  54 
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INTRODUCTION 55 
Older adults who attempt suicide often regret this decision, describing it as a “bad choice.” A 56 
constricted temporal focus on immediate goals and concrete thinking have been theorized to 57 
obscure alternatives to suicide in a crisis1, 2. People often proceed with the suicidal plan even 58 
after realizing, in the words of Dostoevsky, its “absurdity and monstrosity”3 (see also, 59 
attemptsurvivors.com/our-stories/). According to behavioral decision theory, humans aim to be 60 
optimal decision makers by making rational choices as proposed by, for example, expected 61 
utility theory4. By contrast, suicidal behavior often co-occurs with conditions hallmarked by 62 
suboptimal decisions such as gambling and addiction5, 6. While the evidence is mixed7, a 63 
number of studies reported that, in the laboratory, suicide attempters perform poorly on 64 
gambling tasks8, 9 and describe themselves as poor problem solvers10, 11, suggesting that 65 
suicidal behavior is facilitated by poor decision-making. 66 
Behavioral decision research has revealed that people often systematically deviate from 67 
normative standards for rational decision-making (for a review of normative decision theory, see 68 
Edwards4). For example, they persist with failing plans despite irrecoverable investments, i.e. 69 
sunk cost bias12, and make decisions that are influenced by irrelevant variations in how 70 
information is presented, i.e. framing effects13. Systematic individual differences in such 71 
decision-making biases14 can be captured with a validated measure, the Adult Decision-Making 72 
Competence battery of tasks (A-DMC). This measure has reliability across decision-making 73 
tasks, and validity for real-world decision outcomes even after controlling for fluid intelligence 74 
and socioeconomic status14, 15. However, neither these insights into decision-making biases nor 75 
this measure have yet been applied to characterize decision deficits associated with suicidal 76 
behavior. Thus, we investigated whether suicide attempters demonstrate exaggerated decision-77 
making biases. 78 
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Our study focused on attempted suicide in older- and middle-aged adults, since the suicide rate 79 
is high in these age groups16. Additionally, older adults who attempt suicide are more similar, 80 
demographically, to those who die by suicide than are younger suicide attempters. Suicide 81 
attempts also tend to be more lethal in older adults17. Furthermore, most older adults who 82 
attempt suicide suffer from depression18, 19, however, only a minority contemplate suicide, and 83 
an even smaller number proceed to act on those thoughts. To characterize the relationship 84 
between attempted and/or contemplated suicide and decision-making competence, above and 85 
beyond the effects of depression or suicidal ideation, our study groups included older adults with 86 
a history of suicide attempt (attempters), those who have contemplated suicide but have never 87 
attempted (ideators), depressed individuals with no history of suicide attempt or suicidal ideation 88 
(non-suicidal depressed), and psychiatrically healthy older adults. This design allowed us to 89 
investigate systematic group differences in the decision-making competence, which could  90 
suggest or disprove the possibility that decision biases operate at the final stage of the suicidal 91 
process; that of acting on the suicidal ideas.  92 
Moreover, suicide attempts are heterogeneous, ranging from high-lethality, with significant 93 
medical damage requiring admission to a medical/surgical unit or treatment in an emergency 94 
outpatient department, to low-lethality suicide attempts which are not likely to cause significant 95 
medical damage. High- and low-lethality attempters often display distinct clinical and biological 96 
profiles20, 21. Earlier studies indicated that low-lethality attempters displayed exaggerated 97 
discounting of delayed rewards22, while high-lethality attempters were characterized by deficits 98 
in cognitive inhibition23, 24, failure to shift sets25, and interference of social emotions with decision 99 
making26. However, it remains an open question how/whether the heterogeneity in the lethality 100 
of suicidal behavior maps onto specific decision-making deficits. Tests of biases are one way to 101 
capture the decision-making phenotypes of suicide attempters. Thus, our analyses examined 102 
decision-making biases in high- and low-lethality suicide attempters separately.  103 
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We tested whether older adults who attempted suicide would display lower decision-making 104 
competence than the other groups, as seen in lower scores across the following A-DMC tasks:  105 
1) Resistance to Sunk Costs: measures the ability to discontinue actions where costs are 106 
irrecoverable27. Compared to other domains of decision competence, resistance to sunk costs is 107 
a more affect-laden process. For example, negative emotions such as anger28 and anxiety29 108 
have been shown to increase sunk-cost bias. In our previous studies, low-lethality suicide 109 
attempts were associated with maladaptive impulsive behaviors, such as inability to delay 110 
gratification 22.  Therefore LL attempters can be thought of as generally having a lower threshold 111 
for acting on their suicidal thoughts, in contrast to HL attempters, who tend to engage in more 112 
premeditation, preparation, and choose more lethal methods.  Thus, we investigated whether LL 113 
attempters would be more likely to show deficits in this affectively-laden domain of decision 114 
competence.   115 
2) Resistance to Framing Effects: measures the ability to make decisions that are unaffected by 116 
normatively meaningless differences in how information is presented. Resisting framing effects 117 
is cognitively demanding, as one needs to conceptualize the problem on an abstract level, thus 118 
performance is likely affected by cognitive deficits that have been associated with suicide 119 
attempts24, 30-32. Therefore, we investigated whether both HL and LL attempter groups would be 120 
overly influenced by framing effects.  121 
3) Under/Overconfidence: assesses the appropriateness of confidence in one’s knowledge. The 122 
tendency to overestimate knowledge is sometimes diminished in patients with mood disorders 123 
(“depressive realism33”). Given this, and the association of depression with pessimism, we 124 
investigated whether non-depressed participants would be more likely to report confidence that 125 
is not justified by their level of knowledge. 126 
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4) Consistency in Risk Perception: assesses the ability to follow probability rules when thinking 127 
about the likelihood of future events. Given our previous findings that suicide attempters ignored 128 
probabilities on a gambling task9, we investigated whether both attempter groups would have 129 
deficits in following probability rules as measured by this task.  130 
Finally, we examined whether group differences in decision competence were epiphenomenal 131 
(secondary) to other components of vulnerability to suicide. For example, cognitive impairment 132 
24, 25, 30, 32 and impulsive-aggressive personality traits34, 35 have been recognized as components 133 
of individual vulnerability to suicide (“suicidal diathesis”). Studies have shown a negative 134 
correlation between cognitive ability and violations of cost-benefit rules, such as resistance to 135 
sunk costs36 and framing errors37. In addition, certain maladaptive personality traits that are 136 
over-represented among suicidal people, such as high neuroticism, low conscientiousness, and 137 
high impulsivity38, have been associated with framing errors39, 40. Thus, we examined whether 138 
group differences in decision-making competence persisted after accounting for cognitive ability, 139 
chronic interpersonal difficulties, and impulsivity. 140 
 141 
METHOD 142 
Sample and Procedures: 143 
The study included 171 participants (age range=42-97, mean= 66.3 sd=9.9). All participants 144 
provided written informed consent. Data were collected between June 2010 and February 2014. 145 
The University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board approved the study. 146 
Suicide attempters (N=60) had engaged in a self-injurious act with the intent to die within a two-147 
week period prior to entering the study, or had a history of past suicide attempt and current 148 
suicidal ideation with a plan at the time of study enrollment. Medical seriousness of attempts 149 
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was assessed using the Beck Lethality Scale (BLS)41. For participants with multiple attempts, 150 
data for the highest lethality attempt is presented. Following the literature, high-lethality 151 
attempters scored > 4 on the BLS, whereas low-lethality attempters incurred no significant 152 
medical damage and scored a 3 or less on the BLS. Current suicidal ideation was assessed 153 
using the Beck Scale of Suicidal Ideation42.  154 
Suicide ideators (N=30) endorsed suicidal ideation with a specific plan, but had no lifetime 155 
history of suicide attempt. These participants seriously contemplated suicide and communicated 156 
some intention to family or medical staff triggering inpatient psychiatric admission or initiation of 157 
mental health treatment. 158 
Non-suicidal depressed participants (N=53) had no lifetime history of suicide attempt or suicidal 159 
ideation. Participants with passive death wish were excluded from the non-suicidal depressed 160 
group. 161 
Suicide attempters, ideators, and non-suicidal depressed participants were diagnosed with 162 
unipolar non-psychotic major depression using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 163 
I Disorders 43. Depression severity was measured by the 17-item Hamilton Rating Scale for 164 
Depression44. We excluded individuals with clinical dementia (score < 24 on the Mini-Mental 165 
State Examination45), and those with a history of neurological disorders, delirium, or sensory 166 
disorders that preclude neuropsychological testing. Participants continued to receive 167 
psychotropic medications as clinically indicated. We also included 28 non-psychiatric controls, 168 
who had no lifetime history of mental health treatment and no lifetime diagnosis of DSM-IV axis I 169 
disorders (healthy controls, [HC]). 170 
For demographic and clinical characterization of the sample, see Table 1.  171 
 172 
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<Insert Table 1 here> 173 
Gender, race and per capita household income were similar across groups. Non-suicidal 174 
depressed participants were older than the suicide attempters. In addition, high-lethality 175 
attempters had lower education than non-psychiatric controls and suicide ideators. 176 
Consequently, we included age and education in the regression models as covariates.  177 
A-DMC: A-DMC is available online http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Adult_-178 
_Decision_Making_Competence.html; for detailed description see14. A research specialist 179 
administered the A-DMC task at the participants’ own pace. More on sample items and scoring 180 
can be found in the supplemental material. Briefly: 181 
Susceptibility to sunk cost bias is measured by ten items (e.g., You and your friend have 182 
driven halfway to a resort. Both you and your friend feel sick. You both feel that you both would 183 
have a much better weekend at home. Your friend says it is "too bad" you already drove 184 
halfway, because you both would much rather spend the time at home. You agree. Would you 185 
be more likely to drive on or turn back?).  186 
Resistance to framing effects is measured by seven-item pairs of attribute framing (e.g., the 187 
quality of ground beef labeled 80% lean or 20% fat, advising a family member about a cancer 188 
treatment with a 50% success rate or a 50% failure rate) and seven-item pairs measuring risky-189 
choice framing tasks. The positive frames and negative frames appear in separate sets with 190 
different item orders and are separated by other A-DMC tasks.  191 
Under/overconfidence: Participants indicate whether statements are true or false (e.g., Alcohol 192 
causes dehydration, True or False?), then assess their confidence in that answer on a scale 193 
from 50% (just guessing) to 100% (absolutely sure). The overall score reflects mean confidence 194 
minus percent correct across items.  Overall, a decision maker who answers 70% of items 195 
correctly should express 70% confidence. 196 
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Consistency in Risk Perception: Twenty items ask participants to judge the chance of an 197 
event (e.g., What is the probability that you will get into a car accident while driving during the 198 
next year? What is the probability that your driving will be accident-free during the next year?) 199 
on a linear scale ranging from 0% (no chance) to 100% (certainty). Scoring is the percentage of 200 
consistent risk judgments across related events.  201 
Global cognitive ability was assessed with the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale (DRS)46. Scores 202 
on the DRS range from 0-144, with lower scores indicating more impairment; its subscales 203 
assess Initiation/Perseveration, Attention, Construction, Conceptualization, and Memory. The  204 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) was used as an estimate for premorbid intelligence47.  205 
Impulsivity was assessed with the Social Problem Solving Inventory (SPSI) 206 
Impulsivity/Carelessness subscale 48.  207 
Chronic interpersonal problems were measured by the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems 208 
(IIP-15) 49, 50, which assesses interpersonal sensitivity, ambivalence, and aggression indicative 209 
of a dysfunctional personality.  210 
Data analyses: We first examined group differences in overall decision-making competence 211 
using a MANOVA with four normalized A-DMC subscale scores jointly considered as dependent 212 
variables. This analysis was repeated while taking into account possible confounders 213 
(demographic characteristics and global cognitive ability). To examine group differences in 214 
specific domains of decision-making, we performed follow-up ANOVAs using each of the four A-215 
DMC subscales – as dependent variables. Taking advantage of our 5-group design, we followed 216 
up by systematically testing group differences reflecting presumed effects of depression, 217 
suicidal ideation, suicide attempt, and attempt lethality using a Helmert contrast (comparing 218 
healthy controls vs. all depressed, non-suicidal depressed vs. all suicidal (ideators, HL and LL), 219 
suicide ideators vs. all attempters, low-lethality vs. high-lethality attempters). The second model 220 
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also included demographic characteristics to test whether group differences were robust to the 221 
inclusion of these covariates. A third model included all the above characteristics as well as the 222 
DRS score. Finally, in exploratory analyses, we tested potential explanatory variables 223 
(impulsivity, interpersonal functioning, depression severity, history of substance abuse, 224 
premorbid IQ) that may have accounted for group differences in decision competence. 225 
 226 
RESULTS:  227 
Group differences in overall decision competence 228 
A multivariate ANOVA, using the scores on the four A-DMC subscales as dependent variables, 229 
indicated significant group differences in decision-making competence (Wilks’ lambda = .83, 230 
F[16, 516.94] = 2.06, p=0.009, Șp2=0.05), which remained after controlling for demographic 231 
characteristics (group: Wilks’ lambda = .81, F[16, 489.44] = 2.23, p<0.01, Șp2=0.05; age: 232 
Șp2=0.04; sex: Șp2=0.07; race: Șp2=0.06; education: Șp2=0.05), and for global cognitive ability 233 
(group: Wilks’ lambda = .82, F[16, 480.28] = 2.04, p=0.01, Șp2=0.05; age: Șp2=0.04; sex: 234 
Șp2=0.07; race: Șp2=0.06; education: Șp2=0.05; global cognitive ability: Șp2=0.07).  235 
Group differences across domains 236 
Next, we conducted separate univariate ANOVAs on each of the four A-DMC subscales. There 237 
were significant mean group differences in Resistance to Sunk Costs (see Table 2a). While all 238 
depressed participants did not differ from healthy controls (p=0.07) and all participants with 239 
suicidal ideation did not differ from non-suicidal depressed (p=0.96), suicide attempters were 240 
more susceptible to sunk cost than suicide ideators (p=0.04).  Low-lethality attempters were 241 
more susceptible to sunk cost than high-lethality attempters (p<0.002; Figure 1a). 242 
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There was also a significant mean difference in Resistance to Framing Effects across the 243 
groups (see Table 2b). While all depressed participants did not differ from healthy controls 244 
(p=.15) and all participants with suicidal ideation did not differ from non-suicidal depressed 245 
(p=.44), suicide attempters were more susceptible to framing effects than suicide ideators 246 
(p<.01; Figure 1b).  There was no effect of attempt lethality (p=.23). 247 
Contrary to our expectation that depressed participants were more likely to recognize the extent 248 
of their knowledge, we failed to find significant group differences in Under/Overconfidence 249 
(F[4,166]=1.4, p=0.23; Figure 1c).  An additional analysis examining confidence after controlling 250 
for knowledge51 (i.e. whether one is more or less confident than his knowledge would justify) 251 
similarly failed to find any group differences (F[4,165]=2.1, p=0.09).  There were also no group 252 
differences in Consistency of Risk Perception among the groups (F [4,166]=1.9, p=0.11; Figure 253 
1d). 254 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 255 
 256 
Group differences in Resistance to Sunk Cost and Framing Effects, adjusting for 257 
possible confounders 258 
Group differences in Resistance to Sunk Cost scores remained significant after accounting for 259 
age, gender, race, and education (see Table 2a). Poorer global cognition (lower DRS scores) 260 
was associated with poorer resistance to sunk cost, (F[9, 161]= 3.6, p<0.001, Șp2=0.05) but 261 
even after its inclusion in the model, group differences remained (F[4, 161] = 3.8, p<0.01, 262 
Șp2=0.09). 263 
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 Similarly, group differences remained significant when IQ (WTAR scores) (available on 150/171 264 
participants) was added to the model (group: F[4,139] = 2.69, p = .03, Șp2 = .08, WTAR: F[1,139] 265 
= 4.29, p = .04,  Șp2 = .03). 266 
 267 
 <Insert Table 2a here>  268 
 269 
Group differences in Resistance to Framing Effects remained significant in the model including 270 
age, race, gender, and education (Supplementary eTable 1a), F[4, 161]= 3.4, p=0.01, Șp2=0.08), 271 
while age, race, and education explained additional variance (F[9, 161]= 5.3 p<0.01, Șp2=.23). 272 
Including global cognition did not explain any additional or unique variance. However, when 273 
premorbid IQ was included in the model, group differences were no longer significant (added to 274 
the full model with age, sex, race, education, DRS, group: F[4,139] = 2.01, p = .10,  Șp2  = .06, 275 
WTAR: F(1,139) = 1.71, p = .19, Șp2  = .01).  276 
 277 
<Insert Table 2b here>  278 
 279 
Additional sensitivity analyses and Correlations with the A-DMC subscales and clinical and 280 
cognitive variables are reported in the Supplemental material. 281 
Exploratory analyses 282 
We tested whether group differences in decision-making competence were explained by 283 
maladaptive personality traits, particularly impulsivity. Because participants reporting higher 284 
interpersonal ambivalence also displayed somewhat lower resistance to both sunk cost and 285 
framing (Supplementary eTable 1a), we included these variables in our analyses of group 286 
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differences. After accounting for age, gender, race, and education, interpersonal ambivalence 287 
explained no additional variance in resistance to sunk cost (F[4,155]=1.56, p=0.21, Șp2=0.01), 288 
but predicted lower resistance to framing (F[4,155]=5.91, p=0.02, Șp2=0.04), with group 289 
differences remaining significant. Impulsivity (SPSI Impulsive/Careless subscale) did not explain 290 
additional unique variance in resistance to sunk costs or shared variance with group. Impulsivity 291 
explained a small proportion of variance in resistance to framing shared with group, but did not 292 
increase the total variance explained. Group differences remained significant. We performed 293 
additional analyses to account for depression severity. HAM-D 16 scores (without the suicide 294 
item) did not explain any additional variance in resistance to framing or in sunk cost (p>.61, Șp2 295 
<.01) when added to the full model (age, sex, education, DRS, group, WTAR).  In participants 296 
with major depression, lifetime history of substance use disorders did not explain any additional 297 
variance in resistance to framing (p=.54, Șp2 =.01), when added to the full model.  It did predict 298 
lower resistance to sunk cost (F(2,91) = 3.58, p = .03,  Șp2 = .07)), but significant group 299 
differences remained (F(3,91) = 3.13, p = .029,  Șp2 = .09)). 300 
 301 
DISCUSSION 302 
We found significant group differences in overall decision-making competence. Subsequent 303 
analyses revealed that suicide attempters were more susceptible to framing effects than non-304 
psychiatric controls, depressed non-suicidal individuals, and ideators, a difference partially 305 
explained by premorbid IQ.  Low-lethality attempters were more susceptible to sunk cost than 306 
non-psychiatric controls, suicide ideators, and high-lethality attempters.  307 
What are the psychological underpinnings of susceptibility to sunk cost?  When compared to 308 
other decision-making abilities, resistance to sunk cost appears to rely less on fluid 309 
intelligence14.  Rather, it is impaired in individuals prone to regret and rumination about losses52. 310 
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Inability to resist sunk costs can be thought of as a form of entrapment53.  To the extent that 311 
these group differences in the ability to resist sunk costs from the past can be generalized to the 312 
suicidal crisis, suicide attempters’ decisions may be driven by their stronger focus on painful 313 
past experiences.   314 
We found that suicide attempters were susceptible to framing bias. The ability to resist framing 315 
effects is exemplified by giving the same response to a pair of equivalent prospects, e.g., one 316 
presented in a gain and another in a loss frame54. Suicide attempters were impaired on this 317 
cognitively demanding task.  Susceptibility to framing effects was modestly correlated with age, 318 
global cognition, IQ, ambivalence in interpersonal relationships, and impulsive/careless social 319 
problem-solving style. Of these, only IQ partially explained the group differences in susceptibility 320 
to framing effects; results from large epidemiological studies demonstrate a relationship 321 
between IQ and death by suicide and suicide attempt55, 56. It is possible that the inability to 322 
conceptualize the problem at a higher abstract level inhibits the search for alternative solutions 323 
in a suicidal crisis.  324 
Decision making is often thought of as a balance between deliberative and affective processes.  325 
From this perspective, diminished ability to resist sunk costs and framing effects may be 326 
particularly detrimental in the face of extreme affects57, propelling a suicidal crisis. 327 
Our prediction that depressed participants’ would differentially recognize the extent of their 328 
knowledge compared to non-psychiatric controls was not supported. It is possible, however, that 329 
our measure of general knowledge was not sensitive enough to capture domain-specific 330 
misjudgment of confidence. For example, overconfidence has been related to perceived 331 
knowledge in gambling58 and substance use15 in samples characterized by those risky 332 
behaviors. Tasks that assess knowledge about depressive illness and/or self-efficacy may be 333 
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more sensitive indicators of confidence misjudgment in depressed individuals than general 334 
knowledge questions.  335 
Consistency in Risk Perception was relatively similar among the groups and modestly correlated 336 
with interpersonal aggression but not with cognitive abilities. Those who indicated higher 337 
interpersonal aggression perceived risk less consistently. Impulsive-aggressive traits are more 338 
pronounced among younger suicidal individuals34, who may show a greater impairment in this 339 
domain. 340 
Our results resonate with the entrapment theory of suicide53, and the conceptualization of 341 
suicidal crisis as a state of entrapment and ruminative flooding 59, indicating that the experience 342 
of entrapment may be shaped by an excessive focus on past losses and an inability to flexibly 343 
conceptualize one’s situations. Even more relevant to our results is Baumeister’s escape theory 344 
where death is sought to end “aversive […] awareness of one’s painful life situation.1” It is easy 345 
to see how excessive attention to sunk costs – irrecoverable losses – would contribute to such 346 
an aversive self-awareness.  347 
We found that older people with a history of suicide attempts display heterogeneity in decision 348 
competence that somewhat mirrors the clinical presentation of the attempt. Decision-making 349 
abilities of suicide ideators, on the other hand, were more similar to that of non-suicidal 350 
depressed controls than to suicide attempters, suggesting that decision biases may operate at 351 
the final stage of the suicidal process, that of acting on suicidal ideas. 352 
Our study is limited by a cross-sectional design. We focused on older adults with unipolar 353 
depression, as it is the most common antecedent of late-life suicide18, 60.Although we found 354 
group differences in decision-making competence, we were unable to directly study the 355 
application of decision-making competence during the suicidal crisis, which would be possible 356 
only with a prospective design. 357 
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It is also unclear to what extent our findings can be generalized to other populations. In addition, 358 
we were not able to explore potential life-span changes in decision-making skills. 359 
Future research may take a more integrative perspective by examining how susceptibility to 360 
biases, such as those described here, relate to altered decisions and behavior in a suicidal 361 
crisis, and neural signals during decision-making and learning tasks, by looking specifically at 362 
the interaction between emotional states and decision-making outcomes in suicide attempters 363 
(e.g., Eldar & Niv, 201461). 364 
In summary, attempted suicide appears to be associated with specific decision biases. Poor 365 
decisions can also result in an accumulation of financial, occupational, or interpersonal 366 
problems that in turn precipitate the suicidal crisis.  Individual differences in decision-making 367 
competence may guide intervention.  Decision-making competence can be improved62, offering 368 
a possible avenue for preventing the escalation of a suicidal crisis.  One way to address this 369 
vulnerability in psychotherapy with suicidal individuals is mindfulness meditation, provided that 370 
these skills can be applied in a suicidal crisis. Mindfulness meditation has been shown to 371 
improve resistance to sunk-cost bias through decreased focus on past and future and 372 
decreased negative affect63.  Another approach would be a modification of Cognitive Behavioral 373 
Therapy, which has been successfully used in suicidal patients64, specifically targeting the 374 
tendency to dwell on irrecoverable losses.  While the role of framing effects in suicidal behavior 375 
is presently less clear, a case can be made for fostering a strategic approach to decisions in 376 
learning-based therapies.   377 
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CLINICAL POINTS 378 
People vulnerable to suicide make poor life decisions. Yet, we know little about their decision-379 
making competence.  380 
We found that suicide attempters are less likely to avoid common decision biases than control 381 
groups.  Namely they lacked a flexible and critical mind to avoid the effect of framing and were 382 
excessively focused on past negative experiences. Improving decision competence could be a 383 
goal of psychotherapy with suicide attempters.    384 
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Figure 1. Mean group differences in separate decision-making competencies as reflected by the Adult Decision-Making 
Competence battery of tasks. Lower scores represent worse performance. Helmert contrasts were performed to 
investigate the effect of depression, suicide ideation, suicide attempt, and attempt lethality.
1
1b.
a.
* *
*
*
1c. 1d.
* Mean standardized residual, adjusted for age, gender, race, education, and global cognition measured by DRS. 
The vertical bars denote the standard errors of these estimates. *p  .05 **p  .005
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 Mattis Dementia Rating Scale 
b 
Threshold greater than 3 
c
 Inventory of Interpersonal Problems Interpersonal Sensitivity Subscale 
d
 Inventory of Interpersonal Problems Interpersonal Ambivalence Subscale 
e
 Inventory of Interpersonal Problems Aggression Subscale 
f 
Social Problem Solving Inventory Impulsivity/Carelessness Style Subscale 
g 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading 
 
Table 1. Demographic and Clinical Characteristics (N=171) 
 
Non-Psychiatric 
Controls  (HC) 
(N=28) 
 
Depressed 
Non-Suicidal 
(D) 
(N=53) 
Ideators (I) 
(N=30) 
Low-Lethality 
Attempters 
(LL) 
(N=29) 
High-Lethality 
Attempters 
(HL) 
(N=31) 
F value/ 
ɍ2 
P value 
Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Age 68.4 (12.0) 69.4 (8.7) 65.1 (10.7) 62.0 (7.4) 64.0 (9.6) 3.7 0.006 D>LL 
Gender (%Male) 43% 45% 60% 52% 52% ɍ2 = 2.3 0.68 -- 
Race (%White) 86% 79% 87% 79% 97% ɍ2 = 7.2 0.51 -- 
Years of Education 14.8 (2.0) 14.4 (2.6) 15.0(2.9) 14.4 (3.1) 12.8 (3.3) 2.9 0.02 I>HL 
Household Income per 
capita (x 1000) 
24.6 (12.9) 18.4 (20.3) 23.4 (28.3) 17.8 (20.2) 20.3 (18.6) 0.59 0.67 -- 
Hamilton Depression 
Rating Scale (without 
suicide items) 
2.3(1.9) 11.9 (5.2) 13.4 (6.3) 17.7 (7.0) 15.1 (8.4) 27.0 p<.001 
HC< D, I, LL, HL 
D<LL 
 
Global cognitive 
functioning: DRS
a
 total 
score 
138 (3.4) 135 (5.3) 133 (8.5) 134 (5.5) 133 (6.6) 3.2 0.015 HC>HL 
Lifetime Substance Abuse - 5 (10%) 11 (37%) 8 (28%) 9 (29%) X
2 
=
 
9.1 0.03 -- 
Current Substance Abuse - 0 7 (23%) 5 (17%) 3 (10%) X
2 
=
 
7.4 0.06 -- 
Current Suicide Ideation 0.04 (0.2) 0.2 (0.7) 15.4 (8.3) 24.5 (8.4) 25.8 (3.9) 199 p<.001 
HC, D<I, LL, HL 
I<LL, HL 
Suicide Intent - - - 14.9 (5.3) 19.3 (4.5) 12 0.001 -- 
Suicide Intent 
Planning Subscale 
- - - 5.5 (2.9) 8.0 (2.7) 11 0.002 -- 
Age at First Attempt - - - 47.1 (16.1) 54.2 (18.3) 2.4 0.13 -- 
Number of Attempts - - - 1.6 (0.9) 1.7 (1.1) 0.1 0.74 -- 
Intensity of 
Antidepressant 
Pharmacotherapy during 
Current Episode
b
 
- 3.9 (1.0) 4.6 (1.7) 5.0 (2.0) 6.0 (3.1) 6.8 p<.001 
 
DC, I< HL 
 
IIP Interpersonal 
Sensitivity
c
 
2.4 (2.2) 6.0 (3.9) 9.3 (5.3) 9.2 (3.9) 8.4 (4.4) 14.6 p<.001 
HC<D, I, LL, HL 
D<I, LL 
IIP Interpersonal 
Ambivalence
d
 
2.9 (4.2) 3.7 (3.4) 5.5 (5.0) 6.8 (5.3) 5.7 (5.4) 3.8 0.006 
H<LL 
D<LL 
IIP Aggression
e
 1.2 (1.5) 4.3 (3.8) 6.2 (4.9) 5.7 (3.5) 4.7 (5.1) 6.3 p<.001 HC<D, I, LL, HL 
SPSI Impulsive/Careless 
Style
f
 
1.5 (1.7) 4.9 (3.6) 4.7 (3.0) 6.0 (3.7) 7.1 (4.7) 9.6 p<.001 
HC<D, I, LL, HL 
D<HL 
WTAR
g 
111.8 (8.5) 106.2 (14.9) 108.6 (15.2) 100.2 (15.3) 98.9 (18.1) 3.5 0.01 HC >HL 
 
        
1 
 
 
Table 2a. Results: Resistance to Sunk Cost 
Group differences in Resistance to Sunk Cost persist after accounting for demographic factors (Model 2) 
and global cognition (Model 3) 
  
Group Status 
 
F          ɻ2 
 
d.f 
 
Gender 
 
F          ɻ2 
 
Race 
 
F          ɻ2 
 
Education 
(years) 
F          ɻ2 
DRS 
 
F          ɻ2 
 
R-Squared 
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
Model 1 
 
4.2**   .09 
 
4 -- -- -- -- 
 
0.09 
 
 
0.07 
 
Model 2 
 
3.9**   .09 
 
4 .72     .00 1.8    .02 
 
1.6      .01 -- 
 
0.13 
 
0.08 
Model 3 
 
3.8**   .09 
 
4 
 
1.3     .01 
 
1.2    .02 
 
.36      .00 
 
7.9** .05 
 
0.17 
 
0.12 
 
Observation N=171, DRS: Mattis Dementia Rating Scale, **p ч 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Table 2b. Results: Resistance to Framing 
Group differences in Resistance to Framing persist after accounting for demographic factors (Model 2) 
and global cognition (Model 3) 
 
  
Group 
Status 
 
F       ɻ2 
 
d.f 
 
Gender 
 
 
F       ɻ2 
 
Race 
 
 
F       ɻ2 
Education 
Years 
 
F          ɻ2 
DRS 
 
 
F           ɻ2 
Age 
 
 
F             ɻ2 
 
R-Squared 
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
Model 
1 
 
2.8* .06 
 
 
4 -- -- -- -- -- 
 
0.06 
 
 
0.04 
 
Model 
2 
3.4* .08 
 
4 2.0  .01 7.3***.08 5.4*  .03 -- 5.8*.04 0.23 0.19 
Model 
3 
3.2* .07 
 
4 2.0  .01 7.1***.08 5.0*  .03 .01      .00 4.7*.03 0.23 0.18 
 
Observations: N=171, DRS: Mattis Dementia Rating Scale, *p ч 0.05, ***p ч 0.001 
